Bahriya Tersane

Convoys · Compliance and Assurance

The Compliance and Assurance Convoy.

Maps regulators' technical controls onto your Kubernetes cluster, enforces the controls the cluster can enforce, checks the ones it can only observe, and writes dated evidence for each regime every day: a report your team can act on, and a record your assessor can read, in each regulator's own numbering. A glossary at the end of the page explains each regulator and standard it names.

The convoy's regimes are NCA ECC, SAMA CSF, QCB, Qatar NIA, UAE IA, CBUAE, MAS TRM and CBI. The regimes coming soon are listed under Regimes. The screenshots on this page are taken on a test cluster with sample workloads.

The Compliance and Assurance Convoy and Mamluk LLC-FZ are not affiliated with or endorsed by any regulatory authority whose regime the convoy covers.

The problem

Evidence that is out of date the day after it is gathered.

A regulated organisation answers to its regulator for every system it runs, and a Kubernetes platform is a moving one: workloads are deployed, scaled and replaced many times a day. The evidence an assessment asks for, such as which images run, whether they carry known vulnerabilities, who may do what, whether workloads are separated and whether logs are kept, is usually gathered by hand before each assessment, in screenshots and spreadsheets that describe the cluster as it was on one day.

Between assessments that evidence goes out of date, and a control that drifted is found at the next assessment rather than when it drifted. Each regulator also asks in its own terms, so an organisation that answers to two regulators gathers much of the same evidence twice.

The convoy makes the cluster produce its own evidence, every day, against the regime's own control numbers, and keeps it where your organisation keeps its data.

How it works

Four sources of evidence, one report per regime.

The convoy installs into your cluster beside the Tersane charts for Kyverno and trivy-operator. Kyverno is an open-source policy engine for Kubernetes. The convoy uses it for what Kubernetes cannot do by itself, such as verifying an image's signature, and reads the results of its own policies from Kyverno's policy reports. trivy-operator is an open-source security scanner that runs inside the cluster. It scans every workload's images for known vulnerabilities, and audits each workload's configuration and the permissions granted in the cluster.

The convoy reads four sources, joins them to the regime's controls through a single mapping, and writes the evidence to a volume in its own namespace. A namespace is a named partition of a Kubernetes cluster, which usually holds one application's or one team's workloads. Permissions and policies are commonly set per namespace.

How the Compliance and Assurance Convoy works Admission policies, trivy-operator's scans, the platform's declared settings and each node's facts feed the evidence collector, which writes the regime report in HTML and PDF, OSCAL assessment results and a signed manifest to a volume in the cluster, and optionally delivers them by email or to S3 storage. Admission policies Built-in, and Kyverno's reports Scanners trivy-operator: images, configuration, roles Platform facts What BKE declares it provides Node facts Time source, kubelet, file permissions Evidence collector Daily, one run per regime Joins every result to the regime through the NIST mapping Evidence, in your cluster Regime report, HTML and PDF OSCAL assessment results SHA-256 manifest, your signature Kept 400 days by default Delivery, if you configure it Your SMTP server, over TLS Your S3-compatible storage Nothing is sent to Mamluk

Admission policies, in two layers

An admission policy is a rule Kubernetes applies to each object as it is created or changed, before the object is stored. It can warn about the object and record the result, or refuse the object.

Every control the Kubernetes API server can decide by itself ships as a built-in ValidatingAdmissionPolicy: images only from your registries, no service account token mounted by default, resource limits set, environment and data classification labels on every namespace, and similar. This layer needs no policy engine, so it holds if Kyverno is removed. Kyverno adds only what the API server cannot do: image signature verification, a generated default-deny NetworkPolicy per namespace (off by default), and policy reports for the built-in layer. A NetworkPolicy is the Kubernetes object that states which network traffic may reach a group of workloads. A workload that no NetworkPolicy selects accepts traffic from anywhere in the cluster.

You name your authorised registries, in registries.allowed; the convoy warns about, or once you choose refuses, an image from any other registry, and the report evidences the result for every workload.

A newly installed convoy refuses nothing. Every policy warns and records until you set that control to deny, after the report has shown what it would refuse.

The cluster's own scanners

trivy-operator scans every workload's images for known vulnerabilities against a database refreshed every six hours, and audits each workload's configuration and every role's permissions. The convoy computes each result itself from trivy-operator's raw reports, so a check that has not yet run is reported as not evaluated, never as passed.

One of trivy-operator's checks is not used. Its list of trusted registries names only the registries of three cloud providers, so it reports every registry in your own data centre, and every in-country registry other than theirs, as untrusted. The convoy judges where images come from against the registries you name instead.

Platform and node facts

On the Bahriya Kubernetes Engine, the platform declares the controls it provides, such as audit logging, encryption of Secrets and a trusted time source, and the convoy reports each one, switched on or off, as provided by the platform. A short read-only Job on each node records the time source, the kubelet's configuration in effect and the permissions of named files. The convoy reads the cluster's configuration; it never changes it.

The evidence collector

Once a day, one run per regime joins every result to the regime's requirements and writes the report in HTML and PDF, assessment results in Open Security Controls Assessment Language (OSCAL), and a manifest of SHA-256 digests, signed with your key when you provide one. The files stay on a volume in the convoy's namespace, served read-only inside the cluster. OSCAL is NIST's machine-readable format for control catalogues and assessment results. Governance, risk and compliance tools import results in it, so findings need not be typed in again.

A worked example

How regulators' requirements become one set of evidence.

A regulator writes its requirements in its own words and numbering. A cluster can show only facts: which image a container runs, what that image contains, who holds which permission. The convoy joins the two through a reference catalogue, NIST Special Publication 800-53, Revision 5 (SP 800-53), published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). NIST is the United States government's standards agency. Its security publications are free to use, and regulators and auditors outside the United States also use them as a common reference. SP 800-53 is a control catalogue: a numbered list of safeguards, each stating one thing an organisation should do, such as AC-6, least privilege, or AU-11, keeping audit records for a set period. Its controls are grouped in 20 families, and because the catalogue is detailed and open, it serves as a common language between regulations that are each written in their own terms.

The join takes three steps. Each requirement is mapped to the NIST controls that state the same safeguard; each of those controls is mapped to the checks that evidence it in a cluster; and each check examines the cluster's objects. The example below follows one safeguard, finding and fixing known vulnerabilities, from a requirement in each regime below to the same evidence.

From regulators' requirements to the evidence for them One requirement from each of these regimes: NCA ECC 2-10-3-1, QCB 9.4.3.1, UAE IA T3.3.2, Qatar NIA SS 14, SAMA CSF 3.3.17.3.b, CBUAE 8.7.3 and MAS N06 4.2(a). Five map to the NIST SP 800-53 control RA-5, vulnerability monitoring and scanning; UAE IA T3.3.2 and MAS N06 4.2(a) map to RA-5 and SI-2, flaw remediation; Qatar NIA SS 14 maps to SI-2. Both controls are evidenced by the check trivy.vulnerabilities, which reads trivy-operator's scan of every workload's images, with the check that every workload was scanned within 48 hours. A container whose image has no critical or high vulnerability passes; a container whose image has one fails; so each requirement fails, and the report names the container, the vulnerability and the version that fixes it. REGULATORS' REQUIREMENTS NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS CHECK IN THE CLUSTER EVIDENCE AND RESULT NCA ECC 2-10-3-1 QCB 9.4.3.1 UAE IA T3.3.2 Qatar NIA SS 14 SAMA CSF 3.3.17.3.b CBUAE 8.7.3 MAS N06 4.2(a) Vulnerabilities assessed and detected periodically. Automated and manual vulnerability assessment. Vulnerabilities found, tested for and addressed. Patching kept current, among other hardening measures. Scans as often as risk requires. Kept aware of vulnerabilities in applications and systems. Security patches applied in a time set by each risk. RA-5 Vulnerability monitoring and scanning SI-2 Flaw remediation trivy.vulnerabilities Every workload's images scanned for known vulnerabilities, by severity. cluster.scan-freshness Every workload scanned within 48 hours. A current image No critical or high: pass An outdated image A critical vulnerability: fail Each requirement: Fail The report names the image, the vulnerability and the fix
One safeguard, end to end. One requirement from each regime reaches the same two NIST controls, so the same scan and the same evidence serve them all, each in its regulator's own numbering.
  1. 1. The regulators' requirements

    Each of these regimes asks, in its own words, that known vulnerabilities are found and dealt with. In Mamluk's paraphrase:

    NCA is Saudi Arabia's national authority for cybersecurity. It sets the cybersecurity requirements for government entities and the operators of critical national infrastructure, and assesses compliance with them. QCB is Qatar's central bank and the regulator of its banks. Its circular on technology risks, issued in January 2018, sets the technology and cybersecurity requirements for the banks it regulates, in 516 numbered statements. The Information Assurance Standard is the UAE's federal standard of security controls, binding on federal government entities and on critical information infrastructure, banks among them. Version 2.1 holds 134 controls in fifteen families, and maps each control to NIST SP 800-53 itself. The National Information Assurance Standard, version 2.1, issued by the National Cyber Security Agency in May 2023, applies to all organisations, which it defines as businesses operating within the State of Qatar, and to their information assets. It holds 356 control statements in 26 domains, and marks each as a baseline or an additional control. The Cyber Security Framework sets the cybersecurity requirements for the organisations SAMA regulates, as control considerations in four domains. It is distinct from NIST's Cybersecurity Framework, which is also abbreviated CSF. The CBUAE licenses and regulates banks and other financial institutions in the United Arab Emirates. Its Operational Risk Management Regulation sets their requirements for information and communications technology and cybersecurity, and requires them to comply with the cybersecurity regulations of the other UAE authorities. The Monetary Authority of Singapore is Singapore's central bank and the regulator of its financial sector. It issues binding notices to banks, insurers and capital markets intermediaries, and guidelines that set out the good practice it expects them to adopt.

    The convoy classes each as checked, with partial coverage: the cluster can show that its images are scanned and what the scans found, while the parts a cluster cannot show, such as manual assessment, the comparison between assessments or the removal of file shares, are the organisation's to evidence, and the report asks for that evidence.

  2. 2. The NIST controls they map to

    NIST SP 800-53 states the safeguard in two controls. RA-5, vulnerability monitoring and scanning, asks that systems are scanned for vulnerabilities and the results analysed. SI-2, flaw remediation, asks that flaws are identified and corrected. Every requirement shown is mapped to RA-5 except Qatar's, which concerns patching and is mapped to SI-2; the UAE's requirement, which covers both finding and addressing, and Singapore's, which asks for patches within a time set by risk, are mapped to SI-2 as well.

  3. 3. The checks behind those controls

    trivy-operator scans the images of every workload in the cluster, against a vulnerability database refreshed every six hours, and records what it finds. The check trivy.vulnerabilities reads those scans: it fails when any container, outside the namespaces of Kubernetes itself, the platform and the convoy, runs an image with a critical or high vulnerability. Beside it, cluster.scan-freshness fails when a workload has not been scanned within 48 hours, so an old scan cannot stand in for a current one, and cluster.vulnerability-age records how long each open critical or high vulnerability has been reported.

  4. 4. What the report shows

    A requirement passes only when every check behind it passes. A cluster in which one container runs an outdated image with a critical vulnerability therefore fails every one of these requirements, and each report names the container, the vulnerability, the version that fixes it and how long it has been open. Once the image is rebuilt and scanned again, the same requirements pass, provided their other checks pass too.

  5. 5. One cluster, every regulator

    When an organisation selects more than one regime, such as a bank in Saudi Arabia that answers to both NCA ECC and SAMA CSF, the convoy reads the same scans once, and the same findings appear under each regime's own requirement, in its regulator's numbering.

    That is why the mapping runs through NIST. Each regulator's requirements are mapped to NIST once; the checks are mapped to NIST once; and a cluster's evidence then serves every regulator whose requirements reach the same controls. A new regime adds its requirements and their NIST mapping, and reuses every check.

What you receive

Every requirement, with exactly one result.

Each run's report lists every requirement of the regime, in the regulator's own numbering, with one result: pass, fail, incomplete where some checks could not yet be judged, recorded where the evidence is kept for review without a verdict, or customer evidence for an organisational requirement. Every technical result names the checks that produced it. The report states on its first page that it records technical evidence and that compliance is determined by your assessor.

Each image opens at full size when selected.

The regime report for NCA ECC-2:2024: the run's date and cluster, the statement that the report records technical evidence and does not state compliance, and a summary of the 176 requirements by result.
The report's opening: the regime, the run, what the report is and is not, and the 176 requirements counted by result.

What to fix first

Before the requirements, the report lists every object that fails a check, grouped by namespace and ordered by the most severe finding: the workload, what is wrong with it, the requirements it affects, and the change that fixes it. The team that owns a namespace reads its own section and starts at the top.

The report's fix-first list for a sample payments namespace: the Deployment legacy-batch, whose image is unsigned and which allows privilege escalation and runs as root, with each finding by severity, the ECC requirements it fails, how to fix each finding and the command that shows the full result. The namespace's other workload, signed and hardened, does not appear.
Fix first, for one namespace: the one workload that fails, what is wrong with it and how to fix it. The namespace's other workload passes every check and is not listed.

Each requirement, with its evidence

Each requirement shows its result, the NIST controls it maps to, and each check behind it: what the check establishes, what it found, and the objects that pass, fail or are exempt. An assessor can follow any result back to the cluster object that produced it.

ECC requirement 1-6-3-2, software only from trusted sources: its NIST controls and the five checks behind it. Images come only from the authorised registries and carry fixed tags, so those checks pass; the signature check fails for one workload whose image is not signed with the bank's key, and its detail names that workload.
Requirement 1-6-3-2 in detail: authorised registries and fixed tags pass; the signature check names the one workload whose image is not signed.

The same report as PDF, and OSCAL for your tools

The PDF is rendered from the same report inside the cluster, with no browser and nothing fetched, and carries the same requirements and results. The OSCAL 1.1 assessment results give one finding per requirement, in a form governance, risk and compliance tools can import; every release's output is validated against the OSCAL schema.

Every file is listed with its SHA-256 digest in a manifest, so a copy given to an assessor can be checked against the original.

Sample report

A sample, written by the convoy on a test cluster with sample workloads, for the organisation "Example Bank". Its image versions and cluster name are placeholders, and its run date and regime version are those of the sample, not of a release.

Part of a page of the PDF report: the vulnerability management requirements 2-10-3-1 and 2-10-3-2, each with its result and the checks behind it.
Part of a page of the PDF: two of the vulnerability management requirements.
{
  "uuid": "556148ca-7fe8-5dab-8a6a-e38772270d7a",
  "title": "ECC-2:2024 2-10-3-1",
  "description": "Vulnerabilities assessed and detected periodically.",
  "props": [
    {
      "name": "outcome",
      "ns": "https://tersane.bahriya.cloud/ns/oscal",
      "value": "pass"
    },
    {
      "name": "class",
      "ns": "https://tersane.bahriya.cloud/ns/oscal",
      "value": "checked"
    },
    {
      "name": "nist-sp800-53r5",
      "ns": "https://tersane.bahriya.cloud/ns/oscal",
      "value": "RA-5"
    }
  ],
  "target": {
    "type": "objective-id",
    "target-id": "nca-ecc_2-10-3-1",
    "status": { "state": "satisfied" }
  },
  "related-observations": [
    { "observation-uuid": "1fa79b01-9fe2-5f24-8a53-aeea91bed4a1" },
    { "observation-uuid": "b1d44243-7f5f-59ad-a4b2-18e010cce487" },
    { "observation-uuid": "0740bc82-2421-538c-81c3-80fd697352b6" }
  ]
}
An excerpt of the OSCAL assessment results: one finding, for one requirement.

Available regimes

Each regime in its regulator's own numbering.

Each regime lists every requirement of its regulator, under the regulator's own identifiers, with a short description written by Mamluk; no regulator's text is reproduced. Each requirement is classed by how it is evidenced: enforced by a policy, checked in the cluster, provided by the platform, or organisational, which the organisation evidences and the report marks as such. An organisation licenses the regimes it answers to, and the convoy reports each of them from the same cluster.

Saudi Arabia

NCA Essential Cybersecurity Controls, ECC-2:2024

National Cybersecurity Authority (NCA)

NCA ECC in the convoy

Saudi Arabia

SAMA Cyber Security Framework

Saudi Central Bank (SAMA)

SAMA CSF in the convoy

Qatar

Qatar Central Bank, Technology Risks

Qatar Central Bank (QCB)

QCB in the convoy

Qatar

National Information Assurance Standard, version 2.1, issued by the National Cyber Security Agency

National Cyber Security Agency (NCSA)

Qatar NIA in the convoy

United Arab Emirates

UAE Information Assurance Standard v2.1

UAE Cyber Security Council

UAE IA in the convoy

United Arab Emirates

Central Bank of the UAE, Operational Risk Management Regulation, for banks

Central Bank of the UAE (CBUAE)

CBUAE in the convoy

Singapore

Monetary Authority of Singapore, Technology Risk Management

Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS)

MAS TRM in the convoy

Iraq

Central Bank of Iraq, Cyber Resilience Controls and Banking Reform Standards B2, B3, B7 and B9

Central Bank of Iraq (CBI)

CBI in the convoy

One mapping for every regime

Keyed to NIST, so one cluster's evidence serves each regulator.

Every check the convoy runs is mapped once, to the NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 controls it evidences. Each regime's requirements are mapped to the same NIST controls. A requirement's result is therefore drawn from the checks of the NIST controls it maps to, and a new regime is added as data, its requirements and their NIST mapping, without a new policy, scanner or chart.

For an organisation that answers to more than one regulator, such as a bank in Qatar that must meet both the QCB's circular and Qatar NIA, the convoy collects evidence for each regime every day from the same cluster and the same scanner and policy reports, and reports each regime in its own numbering. The regimes are selected in the same installation.

The checks follow NIST SP 800-53, the Kubernetes Pod Security Standards (Pod Security) and the Kubernetes hardening guidance of the United States National Security Agency and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (NSA and CISA). The Pod Security Standards are three built-in levels, privileged, baseline and restricted, of what a workload may do to the server it runs on, such as running as root or reading the server's own files. Kubernetes enforces the level set for each namespace.

Regimes

Across the GCC, and beyond it.

The regimes available today are from regulators in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), in Singapore and in Iraq. The GCC's six member states are Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman.

Further regimes are added in a decided order, each becoming available once it is built and tested by Mamluk. A regime's scope may change until it is released.

Country Regime Availability
Saudi ArabiaNCA Essential Cybersecurity Controls, ECC-2:2024Available
Saudi ArabiaSAMA Cyber Security FrameworkAvailable
QatarQatar Central Bank, Technology RisksAvailable
QatarNational Information Assurance Standard, version 2.1, issued by the National Cyber Security AgencyAvailable
United Arab EmiratesUAE Information Assurance Standard v2.1Available
United Arab EmiratesCentral Bank of the UAE, Operational Risk Management Regulation, for banksAvailable
SingaporeMonetary Authority of Singapore, Technology Risk ManagementAvailable
IraqCentral Bank of Iraq, Cyber Resilience Controls and Banking Reform Standards B2, B3, B7 and B9Available
Saudi ArabiaSAMA Cyber Resilience Fundamental Requirements, for new and sandbox financial entitiesComing soon
BahrainCentral Bank of Bahrain Rulebook, module OM-5.5, for conventional and Islamic banksComing soon
KuwaitCentral Bank of Kuwait Cyber and Operational Resilience FrameworkComing soon

Mamluk's work in each country is described on mamluk.net: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and the GCC.

How it fits

On Tersane, with BKE or on your own Kubernetes.

  • Requires Bahriya Tersane. The convoy installs on the Tersane kyverno and trivy-operator charts, which every Tersane licence includes, or on your own installation of either at a supported version.
  • With the Bahriya Kubernetes Engine. The convoy runs on BKE 2.2.0 and later, which provide Kubernetes 1.36. From BKE 2.3.0, BKE provides the hardening the platform requirements ask for, among them audit logging, encryption of Secrets at rest, Pod Security defaults, control-plane and kubelet settings, a trusted time source and a host firewall, and declares each one to the convoy, which reports it as provided by the platform. On BKE 2.2.0, as on another distribution, those requirements are reported for your evidence.
  • On another distribution. The convoy runs on any conformant Kubernetes at version 1.36 or later. The platform requirements are then reported as not evidenced by the cluster, and the report asks for your evidence of them instead.
  • Inside your perimeter. The report and its data stay in your cluster. The convoy's own NetworkPolicy permits no traffic out except to the email server or storage you configure, and nothing is sent to Mamluk. Every image the convoy uses is published in Mamluk's registry, signed, for you to mirror into your own.

What it is not

Evidence for your assessor, not a certificate.

The convoy maps a regime's technical controls to your cluster and records the evidence for them. The mapping is Mamluk's. It does not make an organisation compliant and does not certify compliance: the organisational requirements remain your organisation's to evidence, and compliance is determined by your assessor. The report says so on its first page.

An add-on

The Compliance App.

An add-on to the convoy, in which your organisation's people read the reports themselves. It runs in your own cluster, beside the convoy, and the reports never leave it. It is licensed at USD 12,000 per organisation, per year, whatever the number of regimes; the convoy's web view and email reports remain included without it.

  • Sign-in. Through your organisation's own identity provider, or with local accounts where none is connected yet.
  • Roles. For auditors, compliance leads, namespace owners and administrators, each seeing what the role allows; a namespace owner sees only their own namespaces.
  • The evidence. Each regime's results over time, what to fix first, and downloads of the report, the OSCAL assessment results and the signed manifest.

The Compliance App, with screenshots of each role

Glossary

The organisations, standards and tools the convoy's pages name.

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NIST is the United States government's standards agency. Its security publications are free to use, and regulators and auditors outside the United States also use them as a common reference.
SP 800-53 NIST Special Publication 800-53, Revision 5
SP 800-53 is a control catalogue: a numbered list of safeguards, each stating one thing an organisation should do, such as AC-6, least privilege, or AU-11, keeping audit records for a set period. Its controls are grouped in 20 families, and because the catalogue is detailed and open, it serves as a common language between regulations that are each written in their own terms.
NCA National Cybersecurity Authority
NCA is Saudi Arabia's national authority for cybersecurity. It sets the cybersecurity requirements for government entities and the operators of critical national infrastructure, and assesses compliance with them.
ECC Essential Cybersecurity Controls
The ECC are NCA's minimum cybersecurity requirements, binding on government entities and critical national infrastructure in Saudi Arabia. The current edition, ECC-2:2024, holds 176 requirements in four domains.
SAMA Saudi Central Bank
SAMA regulates banks, insurers, financing companies and other financial institutions in Saudi Arabia. It keeps the abbreviation of its former name, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority.
SAMA CSF SAMA Cyber Security Framework
The Cyber Security Framework sets the cybersecurity requirements for the organisations SAMA regulates, as control considerations in four domains. It is distinct from NIST's Cybersecurity Framework, which is also abbreviated CSF.
QCB Qatar Central Bank
QCB is Qatar's central bank and the regulator of its banks. Its circular on technology risks, issued in January 2018, sets the technology and cybersecurity requirements for the banks it regulates, in 516 numbered statements.
NCSA National Cyber Security Agency
The National Cyber Security Agency is Qatar's national authority for cybersecurity. Its national standards include the National Information Assurance Standard, version 2.1, issued by the National Cyber Security Agency.
Qatar NIA National Information Assurance Standard
The National Information Assurance Standard, version 2.1, issued by the National Cyber Security Agency in May 2023, applies to all organisations, which it defines as businesses operating within the State of Qatar, and to their information assets. It holds 356 control statements in 26 domains, and marks each as a baseline or an additional control.
MAS Monetary Authority of Singapore
The Monetary Authority of Singapore is Singapore's central bank and the regulator of its financial sector. It issues binding notices to banks, insurers and capital markets intermediaries, and guidelines that set out the good practice it expects them to adopt.
MAS TRM MAS Technology Risk Management
MAS's Notices FSM-N05, on technology risk management, and FSM-N06, on cyber hygiene, in force from 10 May 2024, and its Technology Risk Management Guidelines of January 2021. The notices are binding; the Guidelines are guidance, adopted in proportion to an institution's risks. The convoy holds them in one regime of 259 requirements and marks each as binding or guidance.
CBI Central Bank of Iraq
The Central Bank of Iraq licenses and regulates Iraq's banks and payment service providers. It issues the Cyber Resilience Controls for the financial and banking sector, and the Banking Reform Standards assessed for private banks.
CBI regime CBI Cyber Resilience Controls and Banking Reform Standards
The CBI's Cyber Resilience Controls (June 2024), published in Arabic, which apply to every bank and payment provider, and standards B2, B3, B7 and B9 of its Banking Reform Standards 2025, which apply to private banks. The convoy holds them in one regime of 524 requirements and marks each as Controls or Standards.
CBUAE Central Bank of the UAE
The CBUAE licenses and regulates banks and other financial institutions in the United Arab Emirates. Its Operational Risk Management Regulation sets their requirements for information and communications technology and cybersecurity, and requires them to comply with the cybersecurity regulations of the other UAE authorities.
UAE CSC UAE Cyber Security Council
The Cyber Security Council is the federal authority for cybersecurity in the United Arab Emirates, and issues the UAE Information Assurance Standard.
UAE IA UAE Information Assurance Standard
The Information Assurance Standard is the UAE's federal standard of security controls, binding on federal government entities and on critical information infrastructure, banks among them. Version 2.1 holds 134 controls in fifteen families, and maps each control to NIST SP 800-53 itself.
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
The GCC's six member states are Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman.
namespace
A namespace is a named partition of a Kubernetes cluster, which usually holds one application's or one team's workloads. Permissions and policies are commonly set per namespace.
admission policy
An admission policy is a rule Kubernetes applies to each object as it is created or changed, before the object is stored. It can warn about the object and record the result, or refuse the object.
Kyverno
Kyverno is an open-source policy engine for Kubernetes. The convoy uses it for what Kubernetes cannot do by itself, such as verifying an image's signature, and reads the results of its own policies from Kyverno's policy reports.
trivy-operator
trivy-operator is an open-source security scanner that runs inside the cluster. It scans every workload's images for known vulnerabilities, and audits each workload's configuration and the permissions granted in the cluster.
NetworkPolicy
A NetworkPolicy is the Kubernetes object that states which network traffic may reach a group of workloads. A workload that no NetworkPolicy selects accepts traffic from anywhere in the cluster.
Pod Security Kubernetes Pod Security Standards
The Pod Security Standards are three built-in levels, privileged, baseline and restricted, of what a workload may do to the server it runs on, such as running as root or reading the server's own files. Kubernetes enforces the level set for each namespace.
OSCAL Open Security Controls Assessment Language
OSCAL is NIST's machine-readable format for control catalogues and assessment results. Governance, risk and compliance tools import results in it, so findings need not be typed in again.
NSA and CISA National Security Agency and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
The two United States agencies publish joint guidance on hardening Kubernetes, which the convoy's checks also follow.

Price and availability

The convoy is licensed separately from Tersane, at USD 24,000 per regulatory regime, per organisation, per year, with the Tersane core licence; there is no base fee. The Compliance App is an add-on at USD 12,000 per organisation, per year. NCA ECC, SAMA CSF, QCB, Qatar NIA, UAE IA, CBUAE, MAS TRM and CBI are available; the convoy's installation and configuration are described in the documentation, and Activating a regime describes how a regime is added to the licence and to a running installation.

Discuss the convoy

To discuss the regimes your organisation must meet, or the convoy's licensing, contact Mamluk.

Contact Mamluk